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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1843 the Queen's Bench formulated the modern basis of the
insanity defense1 and enshrined Daniel M'Naghten's name in legal
history.2 M'Naghten the insanity acquittee, however, did not fare
1. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CiumiNAL LAW § 37, at 274-75 (1972);
Morris, Dealing Responsibly with the Criminally Irresponsible, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 855, 855.
The test that the justices enunciated for acquittal requires that "at the time of committing
the act, the party accused [must labor] under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 720 (1843).
2. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). M'Naghten, under the delusion
that Sir Robert Peel, the British Prime Minister, was the leader of a Tory conspiracy to kill
M'Naghten, tried to shoot Peel, but shot his secretary instead. The jury verdict, acquittal by
reason of insanity, was not popular. The House of Lords debated the issue and sought an
advisory opinion from the Queen's Bench concerning the standards for acquittal. Commen-
tators now treat the advisory opinion as part of the original case. See W. LAFAvE & A.
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as well. The authorities sent M'Naghten to a mental hospital,
where he remained until his death twenty-two years later.
M'Naghten never received another hearing to determine whether
he was still mentally ill and in need of confinement.3
The fundamental premise of the insanity defense is that the
defendant was insane at the time of the alleged offense, and, there-
fore, was not morally or legally responsible for his act.4 Histori-
cally, however, society has stigmatized insanity acquittees "as both
criminal and mentally ill-twice-cursed as mad and bad.' 5 Many
jurisdictions, aware of the intense public fear of the criminally in-
sane' and concerned that the insanity defense may provide a "re-
volving door" that allows defendants to avoid both conviction and
commitment,7 impose severe procedural requirements on acquit-
tees who attempt to prove that they have recovered and no longer
pose a danger to society.8 Insanity acquittees are often "in a worse
position than if they had been convicted, sentenced, and
imprisoned."9
Scorr, supra note 1, at 274; Morris, supra note 1, at 855.
3. Benham v. Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (N.D. Ga. 1980), modified, 678 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom. Ledbetter v. Benham, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983) (vacated
in light of Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983)).
4. See Benham, 501 F. Supp. at 1065-66 and authorities cited therein.
5. Morris, supra note 1, at 856; see German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hos-
pitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RuTGER L. REV. 1011, 1011
(1976).
6. Steadman & Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the Public's Misperceptions of the
Criminally Insane, 41 PuB. Op. Q. 523, 524 (1977-78).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
HousE REPORT]; infra note 76.
8. Many states, concerned about the alleged revolving door, have responded by auto-
matically committing acquittees or by committing them under a lower standard of proof
than the standard for civil committees. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1981) (au-
tomatic commitment); HAWAII RaV. STAT. § 704-411(4) (1976) (state need only prove fitness
for commitment of acquittees by a preponderance of the evidence); see also Note, Commit-
ment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARv. L. REV. 605, 605-06 & nn.3-6 (1981). At
least two states, Montana and Idaho, have eliminated the insanity defense altogether. See
Morris, supra note 1, at 897; Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and
Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
281, 283 n.12 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class]. Several
jurisdictions now have a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, which allows the court to impose a
criminal sentence even though the defendant may have been insane at the time of the crime.
See Morris, supra note 1, at 896-97; Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra, at 283
n.12. For a recently published discussion of Jones and a complete analysis of the insanity
defense, see Hermann & Sor, Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in Insanity
Law Reform: Guilty but Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Acquittees,
1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 499 (1983).
9. German & Singer, supra note 5, at 1011.
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In Jones v. United States1 ° the United States Supreme Court
addressed for the first time11 the issue of involuntary commitment
of persons that a court finds not guilty by reason of insanity. In
1975 a trial court had committed Jones indefinitely to a mental
hospital for attempting to steal a jacket.12 When Jones sought re-
view, the Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution
permits the states to confine individuals indefinitely without ever
having to prove continued mental illness and the need for contin-
ued confinement.13
This Recent Development suggests that the Court erroneously
decided Jones. Part II examines the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional analysis of commitment procedures and discusses postac-
quittal commitment in state and lower federal courts. Part MI ana-
lyzes the Jones decision and the exception that it allows for the
commitment of insanity acquittees. Part IV contends that prior to
involuntary and indefinite commitment an insanity acquittee de-
serves the same standard of proof as a civil commitment candi-
date-proof of mental illness and dangerousness by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Part IV also argues that absent proof by clear
and convincing evidence of the acquittee's need for confinement,
the insanity acquittee is entitled to release or recommitment
through civil commitment procedures at the expiration of the un-
derlying maximum sentence for the offense. In addition, part IV
submits that Jones should not control in jurisdictions in which the
criminal defendant need create only a reasonable doubt of his in-
sanity at the time of the offense to obtain acquittal.
10. 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
11. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962),
the Court considered the commitment of an insanity acquittee who had not raised the in-
sanity defense himself. The Court held that automatic postacquittal commitment proce-
dures are inappropriate when the Government, rather than the defendant, raises the issue of
mental capability. In Jones, however, the Court addressed the propriety of postacquittal
procedures for acquittees who have raised the insanity defense on their own initiative.
12. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983),
reprinted in 14 Criminal Law Series (BNA's Law Reprints) No. 5, at 193 (1982-83). If the
trial court had convicted Jones, he would have faced a maximum prison sentence of one
year. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3047.




A. Supreme Court Constitutional Authority
Historically, most states automatically subjected insanity ac-
quittees to involuntary and indefinite commitment.14 In 1962, how-
ever, the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Overholser1 5 limited the auto-
matic commitment of acquittees. The Lynch Court, basing its
decision on statutory construction rather than constitutional law,16
held that mandatory commitment of an insanity acquittee is inap-
propriate when the prosecution rather than the acquittee puts the
acquittee's sanity at issue. 17 The Court, nonetheless, indicated in
dicta that automatic commitment is permissible when the acquit-
tee himself raises the defense. 8
Several Supreme Court decisions beginning in the late 1960s,
without directly addressing the issue of postacquittal commitment,
suggested that mandatory and indefinite postacquittal commit-
ment schemes violate 9 the acquittee's due process or equal protec-
tion rights.20 A discussion of the due process and equal protection
principles that the Court has enunciated in the commitment area,
therefore, is essential to an understanding of Jones.
1. Due Process
In Specht v. Patterson1 the Supreme Court held that a state
may not commit an individual for an indefinite term without first
giving him a hearing on the issue of present mental health and
14. In re Big Cy Kolocotronis, 99 Wash. 2d 147, -, 660 P.2d 731, 735 (1983) (en
banc) (citing former Washington Code provision). For a discussion of early postacquittal
commitment procedures, see Note, Commitment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of In-
sanity: The Example of the District of Columbia, 74 COLUm. L. REv. 733, 735-36 (1974)
("Mandatory commitment was essentially the quid pro quo for being held blameless.").
15. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
16. The Court noted, however, that its construction freed the statute "from not insub-
stantial constitutional doubts." Id. at 710-11.
17. Id. at 710, 719-20.
18. Id. at 715-17.
19. Big Cy Kolocotronis, 99 Wash. 2d at , 660 P.2d at 735; see, e.g., Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (procedures for indefinite commitment of individual incompe-
tent to stand trial violated due process and equal protection clauses); Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966) (procedures for commitment of mentally ill prisoner violated equal pro-
tection clause).
20. For examples of acquittees asserting claims based on the Supreme Court's evolving
due process and equal protection principles, see Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.)
(due process), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (due process and equal protection).
21. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
1236 [Vol. 37:1233
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dangerousness. The trial court, without notice or a full hearing,
committed Specht indefinitely under the Colorado Sex Offenders
Act.22 Noting that imposition of the indeterminate sentence under
the Act required a finding that the individual is dangerous or a
mentally ill habitual offender,23 the Court held that due process24
demands a hearing, the right to counsel, confrontation, cross-exam-
ination, presentation of evidence, and adequate findings of fact to
allow for meaningful appeal.25
Following Specht, the Court in Jackson v. Indiana26 expressed
the general principle that due process requires that a reasonable
relation exist between involuntary commitment and the purpose of
the commitment. The State charged Jackson, an adult with the
mental capacity of a preschool child, with stealing a purse and nine
dollars. The trial court determined that Jackson was incompetent
to stand trial and committed him to an institution until the De-
partment of Mental Health could certify to the court that he was
sane.25 Three and one-half years later, when the evidence estab-
lished little hope that his condition would improve, Jackson argued
that the trial court's commitment order amounted to a commit-
ment for life.29 The Supreme Court agreed with Jackson. Noting
that the trial court did not consider any of the customary bases for
invoking the power of indefinite commitment, 30 the Court stated
that "[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and dura-
tion of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed." 1 Accordingly, the Court
held that due process entitled Jackson to release or to civil com-
mitment proceedings if the state could not determine within a rea-
sonable period of time whether Jackson ever would be competent
to stand trial.32
22. Id. at 607. The Colorado Sex Offenders Act authorized indefinite commitment of
an individual convicted of certain sex offenses if he represents a threat of harm to the pub-
lic, or he is a habitual offender and is mentally ill. Id.
23. 386 U.S. at 608.
24. The due process clause provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. 386 U.S. at 610.
26. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
27. Id. at 717.
28. Id. at 719-20.
29. Id. at 723, 738-39.
30. For example, the trial court did not assess Jackson's capacity to function in soci-
ety, the need to confine Jackson, or the state's ability to treat him. Id. at 737-38.
31. Id. at 738.
32. Id. Less than a month after the decision in Jackson the Court addressed a similar
1984] 1237
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In O'Connor v. Donaldson"3 and Addington v. Texass3 the
Court addressed due process issues in the civil commitment con-
text. A brief discussion of the constitutional doctrine that the
Court enunciated in these cases is important for two reasons. First,
the basic framework for constitutional analysis of due process is-
sues in the civil commitment context applies to criminal commit-
ment cases as well;35 and second, the due process rights that the
Constitution guarantees to potential civil committees set a stan-
dard for evaluating equal protection challenges to the lesser rights
that state statutes frequently accord insanity acquittees.3 6
In O'Connor v. Donaldson3 7 the Court articulated the substan-
tive requirements for involuntarily committing an individual to a
mental hospital. The state had confined Donaldson against his will
for nearly fifteen years. Donaldson brought suit alleging that his
continued confinement was an unconstitutional deprivation of lib-
erty."' Although the jury did not determine whether Donaldson
was still mentally ill, it did find that he was not dangerous to him-
self or others.39 Noting that "[m]ere public intolerance or animos-
ity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's
physical liberty, '40 the Court held that mental illness alone is not a
sufficient basis for continued confinement. The constitutional right
to freedom prohibits states from confining a mentally ill individual
capable of living peacefully in society.' 1 Even if the individual were
both mentally ill and dangerous at the time of his initial commit-
ment, his involuntary confinement could not continue constitution-
issue in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972). The trial court convicted
McNeil of assault and sentenced him to a five year prison term. Instead of sending him to
jail, however, the court-without an adversarial hearing--committed McNeil to a hospital to
determine whether the state should institutionalize him for an indefinite period of time. Id.
at 246. The five year prison sentence elapsed without any formal determination, and McNeil
challenged his continued confinement. Id. Relying on Jackson, the Court held that although
lesser procedural safeguards are permissible when the commitment is for a short period and
with a limited purpose, due process requires that "indeterminate [confinement] cannot rest
on procedures designed to authorize a brief period of observation." Id. at 249.
33. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
34. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
35. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 95-97 (discussion of the Court applying
the Addington analysis in Jones).
36. Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra note 8, at 290.
37. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
38. Id. at 565.
39. Id. at 573.
40. Id. at 575.
41. Id. at 575-76.
[Vol. 37:12331238
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ally after he ceased to be dangerous.42 In Addington v. Texas45 the
Court addressed the standard of proof that the State must bear in
an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. Addington had a his-
tory of threatening and assaulting people and of causing substan-
tial property damage in mental institutions.44 Following Adding-
ton's arrest on a charge of "assault by threat" against his mother,
Addington's mother initiated proceedings for his indefinite com-
mitment.45 The jury found by "unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence" that Addington was dangerous and mentally ill, and the
judge committed him to a state hospital.46 When Addington ap-
pealed the trial court decision, the Supreme Court rejected his
claim that due process in civil commitment proceedings requires
the criminal law standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.47
The Court also concluded, however, that the preponderance of the
evidence standard 6 that a trial court employs in civil cases49 is in-
sufficient to protect civil commitment candidates from erroneous
42. Id. at 574-75 (citing Jackson and McNeil).
43. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
44. Id. at 420-21.
45. Id. at 420.
46. Id. at 421.
47. The Court stated that "[iln a criminal case... the interests of the defendant are
of such magnitude that.. . our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.
This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the
guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 423-24 (footnote omitted) (citing In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
The Court explained that in commitment proceedings, unlike criminal prosecutions,
"state power is not exercised in a punitive sense." Addington, 441 U.S. at 428. Courts histor-
ically have employed the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof only in criminal
cases. Id. Although the Court noted that "an erroneous commitment is sometimes as unde-
sirable as an erroneous conviction," the Court reasoned that "the layers of professional re-
view and observation of the patient's condition, and the concern of family and friends gen-
erally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be corrected."
Id. at 428-29. In addition, the Court reasoned that erroneous release of a mentally ill indi-
vidual could be worse for that individual than the erroneous release of a guilty defendant.
Id. at 429. Finally, the Court explained that a state would have difficulty proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and dangerous. Id.
48. According to Professor McCormick, "[t]he most acceptable meaning to be given to
the expression, proof by a preponderance, seems to be proof which leads the jury to find
that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence." C. McCoR-
MICK, McCoRMICK ON EvmNCE § 339, at 957 (3d ed. 1984).
49. The Court stated that "[s]ince society has a minimal concern with the outcome of
...private suits [concerning monetary disputes], plaintiff's burden of proof [in civil cases]
is a mere preponderance of the evidence." Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. Texas, however, had
concluded that the preponderance standard satisfied the demands of due process in civil
commitment proceedings, id. at 426, although the trial judge in Addington did not use that
standard, id. at 421.
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commitment.8 0 After balancing the individual's interest in avoiding
the stigma and significant deprivation of liberty that accompany
indefinite commitment51 against the state's interest in caring for
and protecting its citizens,52 the Court held that for involuntary
indefinite commitment in civil proceedings due process requires, at
a minimum, proof by clear and convincing evidence."
2. Equal Protection
The Supreme Court decision of Baxstrom v. Herold54 is the
seminal equal protection case55 addressing criminal commitment
procedures. Midway through Baxstrom's sentence for committing
second degree assault, a prison physician certified that he was in-
sane, and the authorities transferred him to a state mental hospi-
tal. At the end of Baxstrom's penal sentence, state officials civilly
committed him without a judicial determination that he was still
insane and without jury review-rights the State affords all civil
commitment candidates except those nearing the end of a prison
50. The Court declared:
The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error
when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible
harm to the state. We conclude that the individual's interest in the outcome of a civil
commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the
state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of
the evidence.
Id. at 427.
51. Id. at 425-27.
52. Id. at 426. For the classic formulation of the procedural due process balancing test,
see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
53. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33. Due process does not require proof by unequivocal
evidence. States, however, are free to impose that higher standard to protect against errone-
ous commitment. Id. at 432.
One year after Addington, the Court again considered criminal commitment procedures
in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). Jones, a Nebraska state prisoner, alleged that his
transfer to a mental hospital without receiving notice and an opportunity for a hearing vio-
lated his right to procedural due process. Despite Jones' status as an imprisoned felon, the
Court held that the stigma and involuntary obligation to undergo treatment that institu-
tionalization requires gives rise to a procedurally protected liberty interest. Id. at 491-94.
Balancing this liberty interest against the state's interest in isolating mentally ill prisoners
for treatment, the Court concluded that due process requires that the state provide suffi-
cient procedural safeguards against the risk of error. Id. at 495. Before finding that the
prisoner is mentally ill and eligible for transfer to a mental hospital, the state must, inter
alia, provide written notice, a hearing with the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses, and some form of independent assistance for indigent prisoners. Id.
54. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
55. The equal protection clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1240
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sentence.56 The Supreme Court held that making a distinction be-
tween the commitment procedures for civil commitment candi-
dates and mentally ill prisoners violated Baxstrom's equal protec-
tion rights. 57  The State argued that the classification was
reasonable because mentally ill prisoners have demonstrated their
need for confinement by having criminal records."8 In rejecting this
argument, the Court explained that past criminal conduct is not a
valid reason to employ different procedures to determine whether
an individual is mentally ill and in need of confinement.5
In Humphrey v. Cady6 ° the Court denounced a similar classifi-
cation scheme in a sexual deviance case. In lieu of sentencing
Humphrey to the maximum prison term of one year for contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor, the trial court committed him
indefinitely to the prison's sex deviate facility."1 At the end of one
year, the State renewed Humphrey's commitment without giving
him the jury trial that is normally available to commitment candi-
dates under Wisconsin law.62 Relying on Baxstrom, the Court re-
jected the State's claim that criminal conviction justifies lesser pro-
cedural safeguards. 63 The Court held that the distinction between
mentally ill convicted criminals and mentally ill law abiding citi-
zens did not justify differences in commitment procedures beyond
56. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 114.
59. The Court emphasized:
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane of course
may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or
medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the oppor-
tunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all. For purposes of [procedures for
determining] whether a person is mentally ill and in need of institutionalization, there
is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing
the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.
Id. at 111-12 (emphasis in original). In addition, the Court added:
A person with a past criminal record is presently entitled to a hearing on the ques-
tion whether he is dangerously mentally ill so long as he is not in prison at the time
civil commitment proceedings are instituted. Given this distinction, all semblance of
rationality of the classification, purportedly based upon criminal propensities,
disappears.
Id. at 115.
60. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
61. Id. at 506. The Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act authorized commitment of an individual
if his crime was "probably directly motivated by a desire for sexual excitement" and if the
state established the need for treatment. Id. at 507 (quoting Wis. STAT. ANN. § 959.15(2)
(West 1958)).
62. Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 508.
63. Id. at 508-11.
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the duration of the maximum permissible sentence. The Court re-
manded the case for the evidentiary hearing that the district court
had denied."'
In Jackson v. Indiana"5 the state court applied less stringent
standards to commit Jackson and more stringent standards to re-
lease him than it applied to citizens that the state had not charged
with criminal acts.66 The Supreme Court relied on Baxstrom in
holding that discrimination based on pending criminal charges de-
nied Jackson equal protection under the law: "If criminal convic-
tion and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less pro-
cedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment
than that generally available to all others, the mere filing of crimi-
nal charges surely cannot suffice.
67
B. Postacquittal Commitment in State and Lower Federal
Courts
Although the foregoing Supreme Court cases did not address
commitment procedures in the context of postacquittal commit-
ment, most states that have faced the issue have extended the
Court's due process and equal protection analysis to insanity ac-
quittees65 In the leading case of Bolton v. Harris,6 9 the District of
64. Id. at 510-11.
65. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
66. Id. at 727-29. The Court also held that the state violated Jackson's right to due
process. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
67. Id. at 724.
68. Allen v. Radack, 426 F. Supp. 1052, 1057 (D.S.D. 1977); see, e.g., Locklear v. Hul-
tine, 528 F. Supp. 982 (D. Kan. 1981) (state cannot require acquittee to prove fitness for
release after automatic commitment; presumption of continuing insanity following acquittal
is unconstitutional); In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978) (en
banc) (equal protection requires that burden of proof shift to the state once the underlying
maximum term has expired); Wilson v. State, 259 Ind. 375, 287 N.E.2d 875 (1972) (equal
protection requires that acquittees and civil commitment candidates receive the same atten-
tion for commitment and release); Williams v. Superintendent, 43 Md. App. 588, 406 A.2d
1302 (1979) (extending proof by clear and convincing evidence to insanity acquittees), va-
cated sub nom. due to legislative enactment, Coard v. State, 288 Md. 523, 419 A.2d 383
(1980); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974) (en banc) (automatic
commitment of acquittees for an indefinite period is unconstitutional); State v. Fields, 77
N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978) (procedures for release must be the same for acquittees and
civil committees); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975) (state must prove that
acquittee is mentally ill and dangerous following a temporary commitment for observation);
In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979) (after temporary
automatic commitment for evaluation, due process and equal protection require that acquit-
tees receive the same substantive and procedural rights as other commitment candidates);
State v. Wilcox, 92 Wash. 2d 610, 600 P.2d 561 (1979) (en banc) (due process mandates that
the state bear the burden of proof for commitment of acquittee); State ex rel. Kovach v.
[Vol. 37:12331242
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Columbia charged Bolton with unauthorized use and transporta-
tion of a motor vehicle. Bolton successfully pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity. Although the District of Columbia Code pro-
vided civil commitment candidates a judicial hearing with the gov-
ernment bearing the burden of proving insanity,70 the Code au-
thorized the government to commit insanity acquittees like Bolton
indefinitely without a hearing.7 1 Relying on Specht' 2 and Bax-
strom, 73 the Bolton court held that all insanity acquittees, regard-
less of whether the defendant, the prosecutor, or the court raises
the insanity plea,7 4 "must be given a judicial hearing with proce-
dures substantially similar to those in civil commitment proceed-
ings."' 75 The court explained that while an acquittal by reason of
insanity is relevant evidence suggesting present mental illness and
dangerousness, committing "criminal acts does not give rise to a
presumption of dangerousness" sufficient to justify removing pro-
cedural safeguards when determining whether the acquittee is still
mentally ill and in need of confinement.78
Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612, 219 N.W.2d 341 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975) (auto-
matic commitment of acquittees violates equal protection and due process).
The Supreme Court in Jackson recognized that several state courts have extended Bax-
strom to cover the commitment of insanity acquittees. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 724. Whether
the Jackson Court approved or merely did not disapprove of state courts relying on Bax-
strom is unclear. See, e.g., Allen, 426 F. Supp. at 1057 (without disapproval); State ex rel.
Kovach, 64 Wis. 2d at 618-19, 219 N.W.2d at 344-45 (approval).
69. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
70. Bolton, 395 F.2d at 648.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 650; see supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
73. Bolton, 395 F.2d at 649; see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
74. Bolton, 395 F.2d at 649. But see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962); supra
text accompanying note 18 (dicta indicating that automatic commitment may be appropri-
ate when the defendant puts his sanity in question). The Bolton court noted that when the
defendant raises the issue of his mental state he is not admitting present insanity-he
merely is raising a reasonable doubt about past sanity. Bolton, 395 F.2d at 649.
75. Bolton, 395 F.2d at 651. The court acknowledged, however, that a reasonable ap-
plication of the equal protection clause permits the government "to treat persons acquitted
by reason of insanity differently from civilly committed persons to the extent that there are
relevant differences between these two groups." Id. The court indicated that automatic com-
mitment was permissible for a limited period in order to evaluate the acquittee's present
mental condition. Id. At the conclusion of the examination period, however, the acquittee
must receive the requisite hearing. Id.
76. Id. at 647, 651.
Congress responded to Bolton with dismay.
This ruling permits dangerous criminals, particularly psychopaths, to win acquit-
tals of serious criminal charges on grounds of insanity by raising a mere reasonable
doubt as to their sanity and then to escape hospital commitment because the govern-
ment is unable to prove their insanity following acquittal by a preponderance of the
evidence. The result is a revolving door which, as now Chief Justice Burger explained
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A number of states reject Bolton and refuse to extend to in-
sanity acquittees the protection of the due process and equal pro-
tection principles that the Supreme Court has developed in other
commitment contexts. In order to sanction lesser procedural safe-
guards for acquittees, courts in these states often rely on Lynch,7
which allows automatic commitment of acquittees who raise the
insanity plea themselves.7 18 Courts have advanced additional rea-
sons for rejecting Bolton: (1) acquittees constitute an exceptional
class that already has demonstrated mental illness and dangerous-
ness; 79 (2) a reasonable presumption exists that the acquittee will
remain mentally ill and dangerous;80 (3) courts desire to deter false
insanity pleas; l and (4) courts hope to correct erroneous acquittals
through the commitment process.82
C. Summary
In the last twenty years the Supreme Court has held, in vary-
ing contexts, that due process and equal protection principles pro-
in rejecting such an outcome in Overholser v. O'Beirne, [302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir.
1961)], allows defendants "to have it both ways"--to escape both conviction and com-
mitment to a hospital.
The Committee [of the District of Columbia] considers this result intolerable. It
neither protects the public safety nor provides treatment for a defendant acquitted of a
crime on grounds of insanity.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 74. Congress took two steps to close the "revolving door."
First, Congress amended the District of Columbia Code to make insanity an affirmative
defense, with the burden of proof on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981).
Congress felt that the courts must stop acquitting defendants simply because they raise a
reasonable doubt about their sanity. Second, Congress required that acquittees demonstrate
fitness for release by a preponderance of the evidence. See Note, supra note 14, at 741-51
(arguing that the resulting procedure unconstitutionally re-establishes indefinite mandatory
commitment).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
78. See, e.g., In re Downing, 103 Idaho 689, 695, 652 P.2d 193, 199 (1982) (acquittee
bears burden of establishing right to release following automatic commitment); In re Jones,
228 Kan. 90, 106-07, 612 P.2d 1211, 1225-26 (1980) (mandatory commitment).
79. See, e.g., Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971) (automatic commitment).
80. See, e.g., People v. Chavez, - Colo. _, - , 629 P.2d 1040, 1047-48 (1981)
(en banc) (burden of proof on acquittee at release hearing following automatic commit-
ment); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 644, 266 S.E.2d 466, 476 (1980) (acquittee bears burden
of establishing fitness for release following commitment for period of evaluation). The Clark
court noted that the presumption against the defendant was valid because the defendant
established his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence at his acquittal proceeding. Id.
at 645, 266 S.E.2d at 477.
81. See, e.g., Warren v. Harvey, 932 F.2d 925, 932 (2d Cir.) (commitment by prepon-
derance of the evidence), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980).




vide individuals with certain minimum procedural and substantive
safeguards prior to involuntary commitment to a mental institu-
tion. None of these cases, however, directly address the commit-
ment of insanity acquittees, and state and lower federal courts
have divided on whether to extend these safeguards to insanity ac-
quittees. Jones v. United Statess provided the Court with the op-
portunity to clarify the constitutional implications of automatically
and indefinitely committing individuals found not guilty by reason
of insanity.
III. DIFFERENT TREATMENT FOR INSANITY AcQUITTEES IS
PERMISSIBLE: Jones v. United States
In Jones v. United States defendant Jones successfully as-
serted the insanity defense to a charge of attempting to steal a coat
from a department store, a misdemeanor carrying a one year maxi-
mum prison sentence.8 4 The trial court automatically committed
Jones to a mental institution, in accordance with the District of
Columbia statutory scheme.8 5 At subsequent release hearings,8 6
Jones failed to carry the burden of showing that he was no longer
mentally ill or dangerous. Still in a mental hospital at the expira-
tion of the maximum prison term, Jones challenged his continued
confinement. He contended that at the expiration of the term he
was entitled to release or civil commitment proceedings, with the
Government proving the need for continued confinement by clear
and convincing evidence. 87
83. 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
84. Id. at 3047.
85. Id. The District of Columbia Code provides that when a criminal defendant pleads
not guilty by reason of insanity and establishes his insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, D. C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981), the court automatically must commit the acquit-
tee to a mental hospital. Id. § 24-301(d)(1).
86. Within 50 days of a defendant's confinement he is entitled to a judicial release
hearing. Id. § 24-301(d)(2)(A). To obtain a release, the defendant must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others.
Id. § 24-301(d)(2)(B); see Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 372 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en
banc), afl'd, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
87. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3047; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) (1981); see also In re
Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
The District of Columbia Superior Court rejected Jones' challenge, and he appealed to
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3047. The court of appeals
initially denied relief. Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (1978). On rehearing, however,
the court reversed and held that the "partially punitive rationale for the criminal commit-
ment scheme" coupled with equal protection principles, entitled Jones to release or recom-
mitment through civil proceedings when the maximum prison term expired. Jones v. United
States, 411 A.2d 624, 630 (1980). Assembling en banc, the court heard the case a third time
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The Court s initially addressed the question whether acquittal
by reason of insanity justified automatically committing Jones. An-
swering the question in the affirmative, the Court noted that a suc-
cessful plea of insanity establishes that the acquittee suffered from
a past mental illness which caused him to behave criminally. 9 The
Court indicated that Congress did not act unreasonably, and,
therefore, acted constitutionally in determining that "insanity,
once established, should be presumed to continue . . . ."90 The
Court also concluded that a criminal act sufficiently establishes the
requisite dangerousness, even though the act may amount to no
more than a nonviolent property crime. 1 The Court rejected
Jones' argument that because the acquittal itself would have evi-
dentiary value in a civil commitment proceeding, the Government
has no legitimate reason for automatic commitment. A postacquit-
and reversed again. Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364 (1981)(en banc). The court deter-
mined (1) that the length of the maximum prison sentence had no bearing on proper treat-
ment for the acquittee or on protecting the public, id. at 369-70, (2) that commitment of
acquittees is not punitive, id. at 369-71, and (3) that a presumption of continuing mental
illness is reasonable, id. at 374. The court, therefore, held that the district court's commit-
ment scheme did not violate the equal protection clause. Id. at 370-76.
In the Supreme Court, Jones framed his argument in terms of due process rather than
equal protection, but the parties decided that either doctrine would lead to the same result.
The Court agreed: "[I]f the Due Process Clause does not require that an insanity acquittee
be given the particular procedural safeguards provided in a civil-commitment hearing ... ,
then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing
between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees." 103 S. Ct. at 3048 n.10.
Jones relied on Addington in contending that under due process his criminal trial was insuf-
ficient to justify indefinite commitment and that the Government should bear the burden of
proving the need for commitment by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 3048; see supra
notes 43-53 and accompanying text (discussion of Addington). Jones argued that his com-
mitment also violated his right to due process because an acquittal by reason of insanity is a
finding of past, not present mental illness, and because the finding of past mental illness
requires proof by only a preponderance of the evidence. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3048. Finally,
Jones contended that the underlying government interest in automatic commitment "is to
ensure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement entirely," a partially punitive
interest that "can justify commitment at most for a period equal to the maximum prison
sentence the acquittee could have received if convicted." Id. at 3048-49. For an account of
the oral argument at the Supreme Court, see U.S. Supreme Court Hears Insanity Acquit-
tee's Release Argument, 6 A.B.A. SEC MENTAL DisABmrrv L. REP. 425 (Nov.-Dec. 1982).
88. Justice Powell authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White joined.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 3049. The Court distinguished Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972), see supra text accompanying notes 26-32, in which the state had made no affirmative
determination that Jackson had, in fact, committed a crime. Jones, 103 S. Ct. 3049 n.12.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 3049-50 (quoting S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955)).
91. 103 S. Ct. at 3049-50. The Court reasoned that crimes against property may lead
to violence and danger "from the efforts of the criminal to escape or the victim to protect
property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal." Id. at 3050 n.14.
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tal hearing, the Court declared, would duplicate much of the crimi-
nal trial and would place a great burden on the Government. 9 2 Fi-
nally, the Court noted that the fifty day release hearing ensures
prompt release if the acquittee has recovered.93
The Court next rejected Jones' contention that prior to indefi-
nite commitment due process requires that acquittees receive the
Addington clear and convincing evidence standard of proof for
civil committees, rather than the preponderance standard that
Congress established for acquittal by reason of insanity.94 The
Court determined that "important differences" exist between in-
sanity acquittees and civil commitment candidates which diminish
the concerns that the Addington standard of proof seeks to pro-
tect. An acquittee, the Court declared, faces less risk of an errone-
ous commitment than a civil committee because the acquittee him-
self asserted the insanity defense. 95 The Court reasoned further
that the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity stigmatizes the
acquittee, and thus mitigates the potential harm of any additional
stigma that might accompany commitment to a mental institu-
tion.9 6 Proof that the acquittee committed a criminal act, ex-
plained the Court, precludes the possibility that the government
confined the acquittee to a mental institution for nothing more
than "idiosyncratic behavior," a possibility that concerned the
Addington Court.97
Finally, the Court addressed the issue whether the length of
the criminal sentence that the acquittee would have received pro-
vides a constitutional limit on the duration of his institutional
commitment. Citing Jackson, the Court noted the due process re-
quirement that the duration of commitment relate reasonably to
the purpose of the commitment. 98 The Court explained that the
purpose of postacquittal commitment, like the purpose of civil
commitment, is to aid the individual and protect society, not to
92. Id. at 3050.
93. Id.; see D.C. Cona ANN. § 24-301(d)(2) (1981); supra note 86.
94. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3051. See generally supra text accompanying notes 51-53
(Addington standard of proof); supra note 76 (congressional reaction to Bolton).
95. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3051.
96. Id. at 3051 n.16.
97. Id. at 3051 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)). The Jones
Court acknowledged that if due process requires proof by clear and convincing evidence
prior to commitment, Congress might respond by requiring that the defendant prove his
insanity by a correspondingly high standard to gain acquittal. Id. at 3051 n.17. The Court
indicated that this response would be constitutional. Id.
98. Id. at 3051.
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punish the acquittee for his underlying offense.99 Reasoning that
the length of the criminal sentence which the acquittee would have
received is unrelated to determining whether the acquittee is still
in need of confinement, the Court concluded that the length of the
criminal sentence is irrelevant to the duration of the acquittee's
commitment. When a criminal defendant establishes his past in-
sanity by a preponderance of the evidence and the trial court ac-
quits him, the court may commit the defendant automatically and
indefinitely on the basis of the acquittal alone.100 The Constitution,
held the Court, does not require release or recommitment through
civil commitment procedures. 101
Justice Brennan, in the lead dissent,1 02 argued that neither Su-
preme Court precedent nor scientific research supports a presump-
tion of present mental illness and dangerousness based on past
mental illness and criminal activity. Justice Brennan contended
that governmental and individual interests are substantially simi-
lar in both the civil and the criminal commitment context. The
Constitution, according to Justice Brennan, thus prohibits indefi-
nite commitment of insanity acquittees without proof by clear and
convincing evidence.103
99. Id. at 3051-52.
100. Id. at 3052.
101. The Court concluded:
This holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees
constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other candidates for
commitment. We have observed before that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in ar-
eas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be espe-
cially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation ...
Id. at 3052-53 (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)) (footnote
omitted).
102. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan's dissent.
103. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3053-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated
that "lain acquittal by reason of insanity of a single, nonviolent misdemeanor is not a con-
stitutionally adequate substitute for the due process protections of Addington and
O'Connor, i.e., proof by clear and convincing evidence of present mental illness or danger-
ousness, with the Government bearing the burden of persuasion." Id. at 3056 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan further contended that the Court's "departures from Adding-
ton at most support deferring Addington's due process protections... for a limited period
only, not indefinitely." Id. at 3061 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At the expiration of the one
year maximum term for attempted shoplifting, the state should have committed Jones
under the standards of O'Confnor and Addington. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also submitted a dissenting opinion. He concluded that although the
Constitution permits automatic commitment of insanity acquittees, the Government should
have to demonstrate the need for continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence




Several courts have followed Jones and denied insanity ac-
quittees the procedural safeguards that courts afford civil commit-
ment candidates.10 4 The fundamental issue here is the standard of
proof that the court should require in order to confine an acquit-
tee: must the state demonstrate the acquittee's need for commit-
ment by clear and convincing evidence, or may the state commit
the acquittee based upon a mere preponderance of the evidence?
The Jones Court sanctioned use of the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard for the indefinite commitment of insanity acquit-
tees. Due process and equal protection principles, however, man-
date that the state should bear the burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence at some point prior to the indefinite commit-
ment of the acquittee. The state's failure to carry this burden enti-
tles the acquittee to release or civil recommitment at the expira-
tion of the underlying prison term. This part of the Recent
Development discusses the proper standard of proof that a court
should require for commitment, the relevance of the maximum
prison term, and the importance of the standard of proof for ac-
quittal in criminal trials.
A. Determining the Proper Standard of Proof
The standard of proof signifies the relative importance of the
determination at hand, indicates the degree of confidence that the
factfinder should have in his conclusion, and allocates between the
litigants the risk of an erroneous decision. 10 5 Regardless of the way
a standard of proof actually affects decisionmaking, at a minimum,
104. See, e.g., Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983) (constitutional to commit
acquittee when state shows need by a preponderance of the evidence); Lee v. Pavkovic, 119
Ill. App. 3d 439, , 456 N.E.2d 621, 627 (1983) (acquittee not entitled to rehearing upon
expiration of initial commitment period); People v. Gamble, 117 Ill. App. 3d 543, _, 453
N.E.2d 839, 841-42 (1983) (lesser safeguards justified because acquittees constitute a special
class); In re A.L.U., 192 N.J. Super. 480, 485, 471 A.2d 63, 65 (1984) (preponderance of the
evidence standard held constitutional in light of Jones); State v. Jacob, 669 P.2d 865, 869
(Utah 1983) (Addington, O'Connor, and Jackson cast "doubt on the legality of different
standards of commitment and release in connection with civil and criminal proceedings, but
the Jones case explicitly approves some differences as to persons found not guilty by reason
of insanity."). In addition, the Supreme Court, in light of Jones, vacated a major Fifth Cir-
cuit case which held that the Constitution requires clear and convincing proof prior to com-
mitment of acquittees, and that the presumption of continued mental illness is unconstitu-
tional. Ledbetter v. Edwards, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983), vacating, Benham v. Edwards, 678
F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
105. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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"'the standard of proof reflects the value society places on individ-
ual liberty.' "106 In the commitment context, the standard of proof
is particularly important for its practical as well as its symbolic
effect because "the allocation of the burden of proof can be out-
come determinative" when the factfinder must rely on ambiguous
psychiatric testimony.107 This section analyzes the standard of
proof in light of due process and equal protection principles.
1. Due Process
As the Court recognized in Jones, commitment of acquittees
implicates a liberty interest that triggers due process concerns."0 '
The Jones Court, using the Addington balancing test for civil com-
mittees, 09 properly addressed the due process question, but erred
in its application. First, the relevant considerations in the civil
commitment context are not, as the Court claimed, readily distin-
guishable from the interests in postacquittal commitment. Second,
the Court's imposition of a greater risk of error on the acquittee
through the preponderance standard is unjustified.
The insanity acquittee's interest in avoiding erroneous com-
mitment should require proof by clear and convincing evidence
that the acquittee is presently mentally ill and dangerous. 10 De-
spite the Court's assertion to the contrary, committing an insanity
acquittee significantly stigmatizes him."' In addition, the acquittee
and the civil commitment candidate have the same physical liberty
interest-both face an egregious loss of liberty upon erroneous
106. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-25 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166
(4th Cir. 1971)).
107. Waite v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 392, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing United States v.
Leazer, 460 F.2d 864, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (Psychiatric testimony is "often unclear, some-
times woefully muddled.").
108. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3048.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
110. As the Court noted in Addington, the mentally ill individual also has an interest
in avoiding an erroneous decision not to commit him. 441 U.S. at 429. The Court deter-
mined, however, that the clear and convincing evidence standard adequately protects the
"genuinely mentally ill person" from erroneous release. Id. at 429, 431-32.
111. See supra text accompanying note 96 (discussing Court's reasoning in Jones).
While the acquittee has suffered from mental illness, the acquittal only indicates past,
not present, mental illness. A determination that the acquittee presently is mentally ill and
dangerous, as opposed to a finding that he has recovered and is presently sane, obviously
"can have a very significant impact on the individual." Addington, 441 U.S. at 426; see
Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 8, at 616-17 & n.54. But




commitment to a mental institution.112 The Jones Court con-
cluded, however, that the acquittee had a lesser interest in the
higher standard of proof than a civil commitment candidate be-
cause the defendant in Jones personally placed his sanity in issue
and because proof of the criminal act reduces the risk of commit-
ting the acquittee for "idiosyncratic behavior." 1 3 This distinction
is without merit. If, under the due process clause, courts must re-
quire proof by clear and convincing evidence to institutionalize
civil commitment candidates who have engaged in prior criminal
activity and already have demonstrated their insanity,1 14 due pro-
cess should provide insanity acquittees with the same protection.
Prior mental illness and criminal behavior are strong evidence of
the need for commitment, but they do not diminish the acquittee's
interest in ensuring that the state does not commit him
erroneously. 115
As the Jones Court acknowledged, the government's interest
in committing insanity acquittees and civil commitment candi-
dates is identical-treating and caring for the individual and pro-
tecting society.1 16 The Addington Court likewise recognized this in-
terest as legitimate under the states' police and parens patriae
powers.1 Noting that a trial court typically reserves the prepon-
derance standard for damages cases in which society only has mini-
mal concern with the outcome, 8 the Court in Addington held that
for civil commitment cases due process requires, at a minimum,
proof by clear and convincing evidence.119 The Jones Court, how-
ever, did not list any additional governmental interests that might
112. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 8, at 616-17
& n.54; Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra note 8, at 305.
In addition, while a prisoner has a significant liberty interest in avoiding erroneous
commitment to a mental hospital because of the stigma and the obligation to undergo invol-
untary psychiatric treatment, see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); supra note 53, that
interest is even more vital when a court adjudges the individual not criminally responsible
for his acts. See Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra note 8, at 306.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
114. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); supra text accompanying notes 43-
53.
115. See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Note, Commitment Fol-
lowing an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 8, at 615.
116. See supra text accompanying note 99.
117. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
118. Id. at 423.
119. In civil commitment cases courts use a clear and convincing evidence standard
because the "interests at stake ... are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of
money ..... Id. at 424.
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justify a lower standard of proof for insanity acquittees.120 At some
point prior to indefinite commitment, therefore, due process
should require that the government prove mental illness and dan-
gerousness by clear and convincing evidence.121
The possibility exists that-the preponderance standard actu-
ally may disserve the state interest in protecting society and treat-
ing the mentally ill because the lower standard may discourage le-
gitimate insanity pleas. 2 In addition, as the Addington Court
120. Conceivably the Government could have asserted that it had an interest in avoid-
ing the burden of meeting the clear and convincing evidence standard. This argument car-
ries little weight because of the magnitude of the acquittee's interest, and because the gov-
ernment must meet the burden in civil cases in which it does not have the benefit of
evidence of past mental illness and a criminal act that flows from the acquittal.
Some courts have indicated that the state's interest in discouraging false pleas of in-
sanity justifies the preponderance standard. See, e.g., Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d 925, 932
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980). Other courts and commentators criticize this
approach. See, e.g., Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1982) (preponder-
ance standard has punitive overtones), vacated sub nom. Ledbetter v. Benham, 103 S. Ct.
3565 (1983); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 649 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (court shall not deny
rights to all acquittees out of fear of abuse by a few); Note, Commitment Following an
Insanity Acquittal, supra note 8, at 619 (not clear that lower standard of proof for commit-
ment will deter false pleas); Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra note 8, at 307-08
(preponderance standard may discourage valid pleas).
Another justification that courts have advanced for the preponderance standard is that
it helps remedy mistakes in the criminal trial. See Warren v. Harvey, 632 F.2d at 931
("While the acquittee. . . may be deprived erroneously... in the commitment process, the
liberty he loses is likely to be liberty which society mistakenly had permitted him to retain
in the criminal process." (emphasis in original)). One commentator terms this asserted state
interest the "cleanup doctrine"-a mechanism for inappropriately ensuring that acquittees
do not escape some form of punishment. Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquit-
tal, supra note 8, at 617-25; see also Benham, 678 F.2d at 524 (preponderance standard
represents "attempt to punish an 'erroneously' acquitted insanity acquittee"); Jackson v.
Foti, 670 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Mental institutions exist for the benefit of those
who can be helped by care and treatment or who require custodial attention. They are not
substitutes for prisons.").
121. See Benham, 678 F.2d at 521-25; Deal v. State, - Ind. App. -, ., 446
N.E.2d 32, 34 (1983); Williams v. Superintendent, 43 Md. App. 588, 593-99, 406 A.2d 1302,
1306-08 (1979), vacated sub nom. due to legislative enactment, Coard v. State, 288 Md. 523,
419 A.2d 383 (1980); People v. Escobar, 90 A.D.2d 322, 329, 456 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770 (1982).
122. See In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 468, 584 P.2d 1097, 1104, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 498
(1978) (en banc); Morris, supra note 1, at 859. In a jurisdiction that uses the preponderance
standard to commit acquittees, the criminal defendant who was actually insane at the time
of the crime faces a difficult tactical choice. If he pleads insanity and the court acquits him,
he may suffer erroneous commitment for the rest of his life because he and society share
equally the risk of error. If the acquittee does not plead insanity but the prosecution suc-
cessfully raises the issue, he has a right to civil commitment procedures. See Lynch v. Over-
holser, 369 U.S. 705, 719-20 (1962). Finally, if no one advances the insanity defense, the
acquittee faces the risk of a prison sentence. Defendants who are not criminally responsible
for minor crimes because of insanity, therefore, have great incentive not to plead insanity.
Courts should not reduce constitutional rights to a simple matter of trial tactics.
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recognized, "the preponderance standard creates the risk of in-
creasing the number of individuals erroneously committed [and
makes it] unclear to what extent, if any, the state's interests are
furthered" by erroneously committing sane individuals to mental
hospitals.123 The preponderance standard thus does not comport
with the reasonable relation that due process requires between in-
voluntary commitment and the government's purpose for that
commitment.12
2. Equal Protection
The parties in Jones focused their attention on the due pro-
cess clause, apparently concluding that equal protection analysis
would yield the same result.12 5 The Court, therefore, did not ad-
dress the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny in an equal
protection challenge to an unfair commitment procedure.1 26 In
123. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
124. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); supra text accompanying notes
26-32.
Individuals adjudged not responsible for their acts should not be "taken from their
families and deprived of their constitutionally protected liberty under the same standard of
proof applicable to run-of-the-mill automobile negligence actions." Murel v. Baltimore City
Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 359 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
125. See supra note 87.
126. The threshold issue in equal protection cases is determining the appropriate level
of judicial scrutiny. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973);
Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has articulated
three different levels of review: strict scrutiny, the rational basis test, and intermediate
review.
Courts apply strict scrutiny analysis when the unequal treatment concerns a suspect
class or implicates a fundamental interest See J. NowA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HAND-
BOOK ON CONsTrrUTioNA LAW 524-25 (1978); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classifica-
tion?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1239-40 (1974). To pass the strict scrutiny test, a state must
demonstrate that its classification scheme serves a compelling state interest and that the
unequal treatment furthers this interest through necessary and carefully defined means. See
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra. Professor Gunther observes that strict scrutiny
is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HAtv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972).
Traditionally the Court employs the rational basis test when strict scrutiny is inappro-
priate. For the rational basis test, the classification need "bear [only] some rational relation-
ship to legitimate state purposes." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40; see also Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Courts that use the rational basis test typically defer to the
legislature and rubber-stamp the classification scheme-"minimal scrutiny in theory and
virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra, at 8; see Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class,
supra note 8, at 293.
Recent decisions suggest that the Court may apply the rational basis test with "'a
sharper focus"' to invalidate some classifications. Hickey, 722 F.2d at 546 (quoting Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (classification by gender for
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dicta, however, the Court suggested that classifications which dis-
tinguish between the commitment procedures for civil committees
and insanity acquittees need only receive minimal scrutiny-the
rational basis test.127 While the parties in Jones did not frame the
issue in equal protection terms,128 a thorough discussion of the in-
sanity acquittee's rights in the commitment context requires a
more detailed examination of the relevant equal protection
principles.
Although courts usually employ the rational basis test for mat-
ters such as economic legislation rather than individual rights, 12 9
courts occasionally have applied the rational basis test in the com-
mitment context.130 Because of the liberty interest at stake in com-
mitment cases, however, several courts and commentators have ar-
gued that strict review is appropriate.131 In addition, the Supreme
Court has cited Baxstrom to justify a strict level of review outside
the commitment context.13 2 The Court, however, never has used
strict scrutiny in a commitment case,"" and the Court is unlikely
to do so given its present philosophy. Because of the importance of
the individual's right to liberty and because the Court invalidated
the classifications in Baxstrom, Humphrey, and Jackson using the
normally deferential language of the rational basis test,1 ' 4 the
sale of beer)). See generally J. NowA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 109-12, 525-27
(Supp. 1982); L. TamE, AuzmcANi CONSTTUTONAL LAw 1082-92 (1978). Under this interme-
diate level of review, the "classification must be substantially related to the achievement of
important governmental objectives." Hickey, 722 F.2d at 546 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 197).
127. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3048 n.10 (1983); see Hickey, 722 F.2d at
546.
128. See supra note 87.
129. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 126, at 524; see, e.g., William-
son v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (economic regulation of opticians); Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (regulation of advertisements on busi-
ness vehicles).
130. See, e.g., People v. Chavez, - Colo. , 629 P.2d 1040 (1981) (en banc).
131. See, e.g., In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 465, 584 P.2d 1097, 1102-03, 149 Cal. Rptr.
491, 496-97 (1978) (en banc) (personal liberty at stake); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511,
533 n.4, 221 N.W.2d 569, 579 n.4 (1974) (en banc) (liberty); Comment, Constitutional Stan-
dards for Release of the Civilly Committed and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Strict
Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARz. L. Rxv. 233 (1978); Note, supra note 126. But see People v.
Chavez, - Colo. at -_, 629 P.2d at 1051-52 (no suspect class; insanity acquittee has no
fundamental right to liberty); Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra note 8, at 291-92.
132. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (poll tax
impinges on fundamental right); supra text accompanying notes 54-67 (discussing Baxstrom
and equal protection concerns of committees).
133. Hickey, 722 F.2d at 545-46.
134. See id. at 546; see, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966) (Equal
protection requires "that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which
the classification is made.").
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Court at a minimum should apply the intermediate level of scru-
tiny for equal protection challenges to classifications of commit-
ment procedures.1 3 5
The governmental interest in the involuntary commitment of
individuals-treating and caring for the mentally ill and protecting
society-is unquestionably legitimate,136 undoubtedly important 3 7
and in all probability even compelling. The fundamental question
is to what extent the means employed by the states-the lower
standard of proof for commitment of insanity acquittees-advance
the governmental goal. Courts frequently explain the rational38" or
substantial 3 9 relationship between lesser procedural safeguards for
acquittees and the state's interest in caring for the individual and
protecting society on the grounds that the insanity acquittee is a
member of an exceptional class, and that the state already has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee has commit-
ted at least one dangerous act.140 Only a tenuous relationship, how-
ever, exists between a lower standard of proof, and providing pro-
tection for society and treatment for the mentally ill. The
preponderance standard actually may disserve the state's inter-
est. 41 Additionally, studies indicate that insanity acquittees are
not significantly more dangerous than their civil counterparts.4 2
Although individuals acquitted of violent crimes because of in-
sanity may have demonstrated a greater need for confinement,
"[p]roportionately. . .such offenders are relatively rare . . . and
the overall policy concerning the treatment of the criminally in-
sane should not be based on the behavior of this small
subgroup. '143
Classifying acquittees as a group in greater need of confine-
ment than civil committees presents problems with the classifica-
tion scheme itself. The classification scheme is underinclusive be-
135. See, e.g., Hickey, 722 F.2d at 546 (approving intermediate level of scrutiny); see
also Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra note 8, at 292-94.
136. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
137. See Hickey, 722 F.2d at 547.
138. See, e.g., Chavez, - Colo. at ....- , 629 P.2d at 1052-54.
139. See, e.g., Hickey, 722 F.2d at 547.
140. Harris v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Chase v. Kearns, 278
A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971).
141. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
142. See Note, Commitment and Release of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity: A Georgia Perspective, 15 GA. L. Rav. 1065, 1079 (1981).
143. T. THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, TaE CRIMNALLY INsANE 210 (1979). But see Note,
Rules for an Exceptional Class, supra note 8, at 292 n.60, 295 n.73 (distinguishing proce-
dural safeguards for violent and nonviolent acquittees).
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cause civil commitment candidates, like the individual in
Addington,1" are more dangerous than many insanity acquittees.
The classification scheme is overinclusive because insanity acquit-
tees, like the defendant in Jones, are not as dangerous as many
civil commitment candidates.1 4 5 Admittedly, the acquittal by rea-
son of insanity indicates that insanity acquittees, unlike most civil
commitment candidates, acted criminally because of a past mental
illness. The essential difference between the two groups, however,
is that the state happened to intercept the civil commitment can-
didate before he committed a crime, or simply that the prosecutor
elected to institute commitment proceedings rather than press
criminal charges.14 6
Although some courts have determined that providing sepa-
rate procedures for acquittees does not satisfy even the rational
basis test,14 7 the propriety of separate procedures turns on the
level of scrutiny that the court applies. Under the rational basis
test, the court usually will sustain the classification if it arguably
bears a rational relationship to a governmental objective, even if
the court disagrees with the legislature's belief that insanity ac-
quittees constitute an exceptional class. 48 The classification should
fail the intermediate level of review, however, because the acquit-
tee is not a member of an exceptional class, because the prepon-
derance standard may hinder the state's interest, and because the
classification is not substantially related to a governmental
interest 149
144. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
145. See Benham, 678 F.2d at 526.
146. See Note, Standards of Mental Illness in the Insanity Defense and Police Power
Commitments: A Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1289, 1299-1301
(1976); Note, The Validity of the Dangerousness Standard for Recommitment of Persons
Found Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease or Defect, 1980 Wis. L. RFv. 391, 404 n.82
(1980). Additionally, the policeman is just as likely to take the mentally ill person to a
mental hospital as to the police station. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INsArM DEPENSE 172
(1967). The policeman's decision thus may have a direct impact upon whether the individ-
ual faces commitment as a civil commitment candidate or as an insanity acquittee.
147. See, e.g., People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 533 n.4, 221 N.W.2d 569, 579 n.4
(1974) (en banc); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 253-55, 344 A.2d 289, 298-99 (1975).
148. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note at 126, at 524 (dis-
cussion of the rational basis test). The Court's assertion in Jones that the legislature need
not rely on empirical studies to determine whether the acquittee actually is a member of an
exceptional class, 103 S. Ct. at 3049-50 n.13, further demonstrates that the Court may be-
lieve that minimal scrutiny is appropriate in the commitment context.
149. See generally German & Singer, supra note 5, at 1012 n.4; supra note 126 (dis-
cussing the different levels of review in equal protection cases). But see Hickey, 722 F.2d at
547.
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Finally, the lower standard of proof for insanity acquittees
also fails to meet the equal protection standards of Baxstrom and
Jackson. Jackson held that discrimination based on pending crim-
inal charges violates the equal protection clause.150 Baxstrom held
that even an imprisoned felon has a right to civil commitment pro-
cedures.25 The individual found not guilty of a criminal charge by
reason of insanity is "conceptually between the petitioners in Bax-
strom and Jackson,15 2 and, therefore, deserves the same proce-
dural rights as a civil commitment candidate. 58 Although the
Jones Court did not address the issue, equal protection clearly re-
quires that insanity acquittees receive the same standard of proof
as civil commitment candidates-proof by clear and convincing ev-
idence-before the state indefinitely commits acquittees. 1"
150. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
151. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
152. In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 676, 394 N.E.2d 262, 267, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 197
(1979).
153. Id. Arguably, Baxstrom and Jackson are distinguishable because they do not con-
cern a judicial determination that the criminal conduct was due to mental illness; some
commentators justify the preponderance standard on precisely this ground. See Note, Stop-
ping the Revolving Door: Adopting a Rational System for the Insanity Defense, 8 HosTRA
L. REv. 973, 1006-14 (1980). This argument should carry little weight, however, because the
insanity acquittee has at least recovered to the point of being competent to stand trial; the
civil commitment candidate is not necessarily that competent. See Comment, supra note
131, at 273. The irrational possibility thus exists that the state is less likely to commit a civil
commitment candidate who would be incompetent to stand trial than an insanity acquittee
who has at least recovered enough to regain his competency.
154. Assuming that due process and equal protection entitle the insanity acquittee to
proof by clear and convincing evidence at some point prior to indefinite commitment, an-
other question arises: How long may the state hold the acquittee on the basis of the acquit-
tal before it must justify committing him by clear and convincing evidence? Automatically
committing the acquittee for a limited evaluation period is justifiable. Commentators have
criticized this approach, typically on the ground that the observation period for acquittees is
excessive in comparison with the short period that the state holds civil commitment candi-
dates for observation. See, e.g., German & Singer, supra note 5, at 1027-31; Morris supra
note 1, at 877-79. Many courts, however, have determined that while automatic indefinite
commitment without a hearing is inappropriate, an observation period of limited duration
to assess the acquittee's present mental condition complies with due process and equal pro-
tection. See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (length of permissible
examination period may vary with each case); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 641, 266 S.E.2d
466, 475 (1980) (thirty day evaluation period is constitutionally permissible); People v. Mc-
Quillan, 392 Mich. 511, 525-29, 221 N.W.2d 569, 575-77 (1974) (en banc) (sixty days is con-
stitutional); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 256, 344 A.2d 289, 300 (1975) (sixty days is permissi-
ble for observation and examination); In re Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 672-75, 394 N.E.2d 262,
264-66, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194-96 (1979) (Beyond automatic commitment "for a reasonable
period to [evaluate the acquittee's] present sanity, justification for distinctions in treatment
between [civil commitment candidates and insanity acquittees] draws impermissibly thin.");
cf. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (lesser procedural safeguards are
permissible for a short-term commitment with a limited purpose).
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B. Relevance of the Maximum Prison Term
The Jones Court stated correctly that the insanity acquittee's
possible maximum prison sentence is irrelevant to the govern-
ment's interest in caring for the mentally ill and protecting soci-
ety.155 Due process and equal protection analyses, however, indi-
cate that the government's interest does not justify using a lower
standard of proof for committing insanity acquittees than for com-
mitting civil commitment candidates. This inconsistency suggests
that the legislature implicitly may have a punitive purpose for em-
ploying the preponderance standard,156 despite the Court's asser-
tion to the contrary. 57 Employing the lower standard of proof en-
sures that the insanity acquittee does not escape punishment for
the offense, even if he has recovered since committing the act.
Although the possible maximum prison sentence is irrelevant
if the state validly obtains the insanity acquittee's initial commit-
ment by clear and convincing evidence, the underlying maximum
prison sentence is relevant if the court employs the lower standard
of proof and implicitly punishes an individual who theoretically is
not responsible for his criminal act. As the Jackson Court stated,
due process requires that the "duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted."158 At the expiration of the prison sentence, society's inter-
est in punishing the acquittee also expires. The alleged "revolving
door"1 59 is no longer a threat, the interest in treating the individual
and protecting society predominates, and the acquittee then
should have the right to proof of mental illness and dangerousness
Although the Court in Jones may have held correctly that automatic commitment is
permissible, see supra text accompanying notes 88-93, the 50 day release hearing that the
District provides, see D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2) (1981), sets a reasonable limitation on
the time period that the state may hold the acquittee on the basis of the acquittal. At that
point, the government should prove the need for continued confinement by clear and con-
vincing evidence.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
156. Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 8, at 619-22; see
Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (insanity
acquittee not entirely free of criminal responsibility); Jones v. United States, 411 A.2d 624,
628-30 (1980), vacated, 432 A.2d 364 (1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983) (commitment of
acquittees under the District of Columbia scheme is partially punitive); HousE REPORT,
supra note 76 (maintaining that defendants should not escape both conviction and commit-
ment); supra note 120 (discussion of state interest in punitive language); see also Morris,
supra note 1, at 882-83 (finding the lower standard a punitive exercise of state power).
157. See supra text accompanying note 99.
158. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
159. See HousE REPORT, supra note 76 (discussing the "revolving door").
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by clear and convincing evidence."1 0 The court only should allow
continued commitment if it seeks to treat the acquittee and pro-
tect society.
Under the equal protection holding of Humphrey, criminal
conduct does not justify procedural discrimination beyond the
maximum permissible sentence.""' Once the underlying sentence
expires, the state's punitive interest disappears, and an insanity
acquittee, like an individual that the court commits in lieu of sen-
tence, stands on equal footing with civil commitment candidates
and has a right to civil commitment procedures.16 2
C. A Limitation on Jones: The Standard of Proof for Acquittal
in Criminal Trials
Assuming arguendo that the Jones Court concluded correctly
that the insanity acquittal alone justifies indefinitely committing
the acquittee, the quantum of proof that courts require for acquit-
tal in a criminal trial is a crucial consideration. In about half the
states insanity is a simple defense and the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time
of the alleged offense."" The defendant need create only a reasona-
ble doubt of his sanity to gain acquittal."" The remaining jurisdic-
tions treat insanity as an affirmative defense, requiring the defen-
160. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Waite v. Jacobs,
475 F.2d 392, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 466-68, 584 P.2d 1097, 1103-
04, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 497-98 (1978) (en banc); Morris, supra note 1, at 883-85.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64 (discussing Humphrey).
162. See Comment, supra note 131, at 265-66.
The Jones Court, in rejecting the relevance of the maximum prison term, stated that
"[t]he inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the length of a thera-
peutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to suggest any clear guidelines for
deciding when a patient must be released." Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3052 n.19. Several jurisdic-
tions, however, have enacted legislation limiting separate procedures for acquittees to the
duration of the underlying prison term. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(d) (1983); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-47(b) (West 1984); WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.020(3) (1980). The
more explicit recognition of the punitive elements in postacquittal commitment procedures,
however, creates the possible paradox that prior to commitment the state should prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee is presently mentally ill and dangerous. See
Morris, supra note 1, at 882-83.
One commentator has argued that acquittees deserve civil commitment procedures at
the expiration of the maximum term not because of the partially punitive character of the
lower standard of proof, but because "[t]he significance of a violent act and an insanity
acquittal lessens over time, while more recent diagnostic information about the acquittee's
dangerousness due to mental illness increases in its importance." Note, Rules for an Excep-
tional Class, supra note 8, at 326-29.
163. See Note, supra note 153, at 987 & n.61.
164. See Morris, supra note 1, at 858.
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dant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
insane at the time of the crime. 65 An acquittal in an affirmative-
defense jurisdiction, therefore, establishes that the acquittee com-
mitted the offense because he was mentally ill."s An acquittal in a
simple-defense jurisdiction, however, is not an affirmative finding
of past insanity. Accordingly, the Court in Jones appropriately
framed its holding narrowly, stating that "when a criminal defen-
dant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not
guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits"
automatic and indefinite commitment on the basis of the acquittal
alone.16
7
At least one jurisdiction, however, has sanctioned automatic
and indefinite commitment on the basis of an acquittal that the
defendant obtained by creating only a reasonable doubt about his
sanity. 6 " While a presumption of continued mental illness is high-
ly questionable even in an affirmative-defense jurisdiction,""9 the
presumption is entirely unjustified in a simple-defense jurisdiction,
where the acquittal indicates only that the jury had a reasonable
doubt about the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense.17 0 A
reasonable doubt about the acquittee's sanity at the time of the
offense, however, bears only the "flimsiest relation" to the acquit-
tee's present mental condition7 and does not justify indefinitely
institutionalizing him.17 2
165. See Note, supra note 153, at 987-88 & n.62.
166. See id. at 1002 n.121.
167. Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 3052 (emphasis added).
168. People v. Chavez, - Colo. , -, 629 P.2d 1040, 1047-54 (1981) (en banc).
169. See German & Singer, supra note 5, at 1018-20. The authors argue that at most
the acquittal indicates mental illness at one point in the past. The acquittee, however, is
now at least sane enough to stand trial. In addition, tests for acquittal and commitment
differ, and the relation between past and present mental illness is too tenuous. See also id.
at 1026-27 & n.68 (merely creating a reasonable doubt about defendant's sanity in a simple-
defense jurisdiction is not the only basis for rejecting the presumption of continued mental
illness); Morris, supra note 1, at 858 (presumption is illogical), 873-74 (presumption is not
justified even when defendant proves past insanity by a preponderance of the evidence).
170. See Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324, 330 (5th Cir. 1978) (reasonable doubt about
acquittee's past insanity does not substitute for a hearing to determine the acquittee's pre-
sent mental condition); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 645, 266 S.E.2d 466, 477 (1980) (courts
rejecting presumption are simple-defense jurisdictions); Wilson v. State, 259 Ind. 375, 385,
287 N.E.2d 875, 881 (1972) (State's failure to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt "does
not, in law, raise any presumption of insanity").
171. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
172. A court's rejection of indefinite commitment procedures solely because of an ac-
quittal that the defendant obtains when the prosecution fails to prove the defendant's past




The Supreme Court in Jones held that if a court determines
that an individual is not criminally responsible for his conduct by
reason of past mental illness, the state may confine him indefi-
nitely upon a showing that the mental illness probably caused the
past conduct, even if no evidence exists to demonstrate clearly that
he is presently mentally ill. This Recent Development has argued
that fundamental principles of due process and equal protection
require that the state only institutionalize an insanity acquittee in-
definitely if the state is appropriately satisfied that the acquittee is
in need of permanent confinement. Neither society nor the individ-
ual benefits when a court erroneously commits a sane individual to
a mental institution-a possibility that greatly increases by lower-
ing the standard of proof for commitment.
A state's willingness to risk the possibility of erroneous com-
mitment indicates that the state is unwilling to accept that an in-
dividual may not be responsible for his criminal behavior. To re-
tain the insanity defense, states must understand that they cannot
surreptitiously punish the insanity acquittee by sending him to a
mental hospital for an indefinite period when he is not mentally ill.
If a court determines that an individual is accountable for his acts,
it should send him to prison. If the court determines that he
clearly is mentally ill, it should send him to a mental hospital.
Mental hospitals "exist for the benefit of those who can be helped
by care and treatment or who require custodial attention. They are
not substitutes for prisons. '173
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insanity an affirmative defense. The affirmaive-defense approach, however, may be prefera-
ble to unjustified indefinite commitment based only on a reasonable doubt about the acquit-
tee's past sanity. See Note, supra note 153, at 991 (Insanity as an affirmative defense "pro-
vides the cornerstone for a rational postacquittal system for handling the insanity
acquittee.").
173. Jackson v. Foti, 670 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1982).
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